8,934 critical and high threats got past the firewall. OneFirewall caught every one.
Confidential Org runs a public-facing web application service behind Check Point and FortiGate firewalls. Over 19 days in November 2026, OneFirewall Alliance scored all 274,153 events crossing the perimeter and found 24,132 malicious ones hiding inside traffic the firewall had already allowed.
- 200,434 events permitted, 74,659 blocked
- Rules based on ports, protocols and policy
- All 10 highest-scoring threat actors allowed through
- 24,132 malicious events found inside permitted traffic
- 8,934 critical and high events intercepted
- 23,654 critical events already blocked by the checkpoint-ip feed
A web application is never only a web application
Confidential Org's customers reach the service over HTTP and HTTPS. The same hosts also expose SSH, SFTP, FTP and RDP for administration and file exchange, protected by two Check Point gateways and two FortiGate firewalls. Three quarters of the traffic is inbound from the internet.
- Firewall rules allow by design — a web service has to accept connections from anyone, so port-based policy can't tell a customer from a scanner.
- Six exposed services, evenly attacked — HTTP, HTTPS, RDP, SSH, FTP and SFTP each carried around 46,000 events. Protecting port 443 alone would cover only a third of the attack surface.
- Thousands of one-shot sources — 4,137 unique low-severity IPs produced 4,139 events: almost every source touched the perimeter once, then moved on. Reacting after the first hit is already too late.
- No context on who is knocking — the firewall logs an allowed connection, not whether that IP was reported by other alliance members an hour earlier.
What crossed Confidential Org's perimeter
OneFirewall scored every event against alliance intelligence. 88% of permitted traffic was clean. The other 12% carried a crime score, and almost 9,000 of those events were critical or high.
Malicious permitted traffic by crime score
Each event is scored 1–1000 by the OneFirewall Crime Score. Critical and high sources are the ones to block at the edge without review.
| Severity | Score range | Permitted events | Share | Unique IPs | Already blocked |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 175 - 1000 | 7,357 | 30% | 2,343 | 23,654 |
| High | 120 - 175 | 1,577 | 7% | 673 | 5,188 |
| Medium | 60 - 120 | 11,059 | 46% | 2,629 | 35,258 |
| Low | 1 - 60 | 4,139 | 17% | 4,137 | 9,261 |
Already blocked: malicious events Confidential Org's firewalls had already stopped thanks to OneFirewall intelligence feeds.
Where the pressure landed
Top services by events
Attackers spread their effort almost perfectly evenly. Web traffic (HTTP and HTTPS) was 91,925 events, but RDP, SSH, FTP and SFTP together drew twice that.
Top origin countries
The United States led origin countries by a wide margin, followed by Western European hosting hubs. Attack infrastructure is usually rented, not local.
Top devices by events
| Device | Vendor | Events |
|---|---|---|
| Check Point gateway 1 | Check Point | 874 |
| FortiGate firewall 1 | Fortinet | 844 |
| Check Point gateway 2 | Check Point | 844 |
| FortiGate firewall 2 | Fortinet | 387 |
Every one of them was allowed in
The ten highest-scoring sources in the period all scored 844 or more out of 1000. Confidential Org's firewall allowed every one of their connections. OneFirewall flagged every one as critical. Last octets are masked.
| # | Source IP | Crime Score | Hits | Firewall action | Service | Country |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 195.178.110.x | 971 | 21 | Allow | HTTP | The Netherlands |
| 2 | 102.220.161.x | 954 | 4 | Allow | FTP | Nigeria |
| 3 | 37.120.213.x | 946 | 1 | Allow | SSH | Switzerland |
| 4 | 119.28.84.x | 935 | 7 | Allow | SFTP | Hong Kong |
| 5 | 179.43.153.x | 888 | 2 | Allow | FTP | Switzerland |
| 6 | 156.227.234.x | 888 | 7 | Allow | HTTP | Japan |
| 7 | 102.220.161.x | 872 | 4 | Allow | FTP | Nigeria |
| 8 | 195.178.110.x | 846 | 1 | Allow | HTTPS | The Netherlands |
| 9 | 107.150.123.x | 845 | 1 | Allow | SSH | Hong Kong |
| 10 | 92.118.39.x | 844 | 1 | Allow | RDP | Romania |
Five things Confidential Org's data tells us
12% of allowed traffic was malicious
24,132 of 200,434 permitted events matched a threat. A firewall enforces policy. It doesn't know reputation. Without intelligence, those events reach the web application and the admin services behind it.
RDP and SSH were hit as hard as HTTP
The six exposed services each took between 45,483 and 46,013 events. Attackers sweep every open port with the same tooling. Web application protection must cover the whole host, not just the HTTP listener.
Top-scoring IPs made as few as one connection
Five of the top ten threat actors made one or two connections in 19 days. Rate limits and anomaly detection never trigger on a single request. Only prior intelligence (who this IP is and what it did elsewhere) can stop the first hit.
4,137 low-severity IPs, 4,139 events
Nearly one event per source. That's the signature of distributed scanning: a different address every time. Blocking it means using intelligence shared across 290+ alliance members, not waiting to see an IP twice.
23,654 critical events stopped before they started
The checkpoint-ip feed had already blocked 23,654 critical events at Confidential Org's Check Point gateways, more than three times the critical events still arriving through permitted traffic.
What OneFirewall delivered for Confidential Org
8,934
Critical and high events intercepted that the firewall had permitted.
3,016
Distinct critical and high sources identified and ready to block at the edge.
23,654
Critical events already stopped automatically by the checkpoint-ip intelligence feed.
176,302
Clean events left untouched, so legitimate users of the web application kept full access.
6
Exposed services covered: HTTP, HTTPS, RDP, SSH, FTP and SFTP, all scored by the same intelligence.
2
Firewall vendors (Check Point and FortiGate) enforcing one shared blocklist, with no vendor lock-in.
“The firewall did exactly what it was configured to do: allow traffic to a public service. OneFirewall told us which of those allowed connections we should never have accepted.”
